In Walter Russel Meade’s seminal work, Special Providence, he analyzes four archetypal “schools” of American foreign policy: Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Wilsonian, and Jacksonian. The openly nationalist Hamiltonian school focuses on enhancing commerce and free markets as the locus of policy and as a means of promoting international cooperation and stability. The Jeffersonian approach, by contrast, is indifferent to nationalist impulses and, also, indifferent to the point of hostility to any form of internationalism. The Jeffersonian school centers, instead, on the promotion of democracy and the virtues of individuals at a remove from the corrupting influences of foreign engagement. Arguably the most pervasive American foreign policy approach in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is centered in Wilsonian Idealism. The Wilsonian school advocates the spread of democracy not only in the interests of the United States, but as an enlightened and even morally superior form of governance that embraces universal democratic ideals.

Mead describes the Jacksonian school, named after President Andrew Jackson, not as idealist, but as deeply nationalistic. Jacksonian approaches are usually insular and seek to preserve options for unilateralism and independence of action in foreign affairs. Adherents of this approach are, at heart, imbued with protectionism. Moreover, Jacksonians are wary of international institutions, and of making multi-lateral agreements and overseas alliances central elements of foreign policy. Critical of elitists, Jacksonians are populists committed first and foremost to a grass-roots democracy that promotes the national interest at home and abroad. When those interests are threatened, Jacksonians are fiercely determined to act with overwhelming force to defend the nation. In the days leading to Trump’s second inauguration and the onset of his administration’s new foreign policy initiatives, observers would do well to revisit the underpinnings of Jacksonian foreign policy.

That’s because Trump’s political instincts—as exhibited in his first presidency and on the campaign trail for his second—are reflexively Jacksonian, deeply rooted in an “America First” branded nationalism. This brand is positioned inside a populist platform antagonistic to the post-WWII global order and alliances viewed by Trump as unequal burdens borne by American blood and treasure expended in “forever wars.” It is marked by an aversion to trade regimes that expose Americans to unfair competition and weaken the American economy. And it is characterized by a deep suspicion of liberal internationalist and values-driven approaches to world affairs.

These are pivotal factors that will shape Trump’s foreign policy during the next four years, especially his administration’s China policy. Trump’s foreign affairs team will face an increasingly aggressive China—with territorial ambitions bolstered by an unprecedented conventional and nuclear military build-up—that is now a geo-economic world power.

Indo-Pacific Engagement

Trump will enter his second term in office at a time when Beijing seeks hegemonic status in the Indo-Pacific. China is relentless in pressing its claims to territories and territorial waters stretching from the South China Sea to Taiwan to the Senkakus in the East China Sea. In addition, Chinese president for life Xi Jinping has made no secret of his desire to displace the US and liberal democracies in Asia with a new order aligned to Chinese Communist Party authoritarianism.

Against this backdrop, Trump has already signaled he intends to take a more assertive foreign policy posture toward China. Trump selected two of Capitol Hill’s most vocal critics of China to head his foreign affairs team­: Representative Mike Waltz as National Security Advisor and Senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State. Their policy positions, and the legislation they have introduced, square with the 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy released during Trump’s first term. Echoing former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 2016 call for a “free and open Indo-Pacific” region, this remains the standing US strategy. The plan is rooted in rules-driven, lawful, and prevailing international conventions (e.g., freedom of navigation, maritime law enforcement), economic growth, and regional stability underpinned by strategic geopolitical and economic partnerships.

Trump’s foreign policy team will inherit improved US ties with Japan, Vietnam, Singapore, and the Philippines—all existing partnerships further developed during the Biden administration. Biden adopted the whole of the Trump Indo-Pacific Strategy and pursued an active regional engagement policy. He also reinvigorated the Quadrilateral (Quad) Dialogue among the United States, Australia, India, and Japan. Today, widespread concerns among Asian nations about Beijing’s growing malign influence and China’s unprecedented military build-up will foster a readiness to develop more regional partnering, as evidenced by the recent trilateral engagement among the United States, the Philippines, and Japan.

That said, the Trump administration will likely be open to continued Indo-Pacific engagement and pursue new initiatives promoted by Rubio and Waltz. Waltz has previously voiced support for greater ties to India and this signals the administration’s willingness to pursue other balanced, bilateral approaches in the region. These approaches would build on established multinational efforts and include more expansive roles with regional organizations including the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. This will also likely generate greater military-to-military cooperation with allies Japan, South Korea, Australia, and future partners, including India. A prototype for the level of partnership needed for effective regional defense and deterrence already exists in the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (1951) and the more recent 2023 Bilateral Defense Guidelines agreed by the two countries.

To successfully craft an effective theater-wide plan of engagement for the Indo-Pacific, the Trump administration will also need to avoid missteps that can be exploited by Beijing. During his first term, for example, Trump unilaterally withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a sweeping trade agreement among 12 Pacific Rim nations. China responded to that move by joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership among 15 nations that account for 30 percent of global GDP. Now Asia-Pacific countries are better positioned to link trade and their supply chains with China than with the United States.

Trade issues in the Indo-Pacific, then, will loom large in any strategy for the region, especially as policymakers attempt to derisk sectors of the US economy from dependence on Chinese manufacturing and expand trade with Asian nations that include more than a third of the world’s population.

Trade, Tariffs, and Transactions

Trump has repeatedly denounced the unfairness of US trade with China. In particular, he blames China’s subsidized industries, dumping (goods sold below the cost of production), and cheap (often slave) labor for killing American manufacturing and industrial jobs. Trump’s populist arguments are deeply rooted in a prickly and defensive Jacksonian nationalism and, as such, take no stock of other more complex realities that have led to the decline of American manufacturing and domestic industries. Moreover, Trump regards trade deficits—with China or any other nation—as prima facie evidence of inequitable dealings that redound to America’s economic disadvantage.

During his campaign, Trump threatened to respond by imposing tariffs as high as 60 to 100 percent on Chinese trade goods entering the US market (and 10 to 20 percent on other nations’ exports). There is probably more rhetoric than reality in this threat. High tariffs on goods imported from China (and other nations) would be hugely inflationary; the increased costs would simply be passed on to the consumer. In the absence of broader domestic policies to encourage and even underwrite reshored manufacturing, there are few readily available “Made in the USA” alternatives for many of the disposable or durable goods made in China that fill the stores on Main Street America.

It would be a mistake, however, to view these tariffs as empty campaign promises. Trump’s nominee for Secretary of the Treasury, Scott Bessent, has suggested Trump’s “maximalist” positions on trade would be subject to negotiations that include other issues with trading partners. For example, Trump has threatened tariffs on Chinese goods failing Beijing’s demonstrable commitment to stop pushing the killer drug fentanyl into the United States from processors in China. This is additional evidence of Trump’s intent to take a transactional approach to foreign policy and secure deals to bolster the US economy and security.

Realistically, Trump is probably prepared to strike a true fair-trade deal with China and tie tariffs to other concessions, even as he pushes the United States away from dependence on Chinese manufacturing. This is not a partisan issue, either. The Biden administration opted to maintain Trump’s first-term tariffs on $380 billion of Chinese goods and hiked the tariffs on other categories totaling $18 billion more. The European Union has also joined the US in adopting anti-dumping measures that target China.

Trump’s foreign policy for China will hinge then, in part, on undoing decades of unbalanced trade and on new initiatives to redress unfair trade practices that include reverse engineering of US patented products, the outright theft of intellectual and proprietary property (estimated in an FBI study and a report from the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property at upwards of $600 billion annually), and industrial espionage. Even though the trade deficit with China shows signs of continued decline (to $386 billion in 2023 from an all-time high of $557 billion in 2022) in 2024, the China hawks in the new administration will see economic competition as one facet of the larger peer competitor challenge emanating from Beijing. This is a competition the new national security team in Washington and the country itself can ill afford to lose.

Taiwan: The Return of Ambiguity

In addition to trade and regional security issues, Trump’s China policy will include a reset on the Taiwan issue. For decades, Washington’s “One China policy” approach to Taipei avowed recognition of Beijing’s claim that Taiwan is part of the sovereign nation of China. Washington’s relationship with Taipei has long been couched in “strategic ambiguity” that straddles the fence as it prefers a political solution, rather than an outright declaration of Taiwanese independence, or reunification of Taiwan with China by force. Even so, the United States maintains de facto diplomatic relations with Taiwan and is required by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act to make arms available “to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” on the island.

Moreover, Taiwan is bound to the United States in significant trade relations. Largely on the strength of its information technology exports, Taiwan is among the top 10 US trading partners. In 2023, the United States had a bilateral deficit of $48 billion on trade of more than $160 billion with Taiwan. US tech manufacturers are also critically dependent on Taiwanese semiconductors; nearly 45 percent of logic chips are imported from the island.

Despite the stridency of the new administration’s China hawks, the Trump White House appears unlikely to endorse a policy to defend Taiwan. While it is impossible to walk back Biden’s declarations the United States would come to the defense of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack—he said it on four very public occasions—Trump can simply ignore those pronouncements. This is a decidedly Jacksonian posture; it avoids a commitment to foreign wars of no immediate threat to the US and reserves the nation’s right for a fierce defense of American interests. Unless China targets US naval forces or military bases in the Pacific, Trump is unlikely to defend Taiwan. Instead, the incoming administration will likely renew Trump’s previous calls for Taiwan to unilaterally increase defense spending and eschew outright military aid to Taipei, like the $900 billion advanced by the Biden administration.

Trump’s previous calls for Taiwan to spend 10 percent of its GDP on defense could be moderated as Taipei has nearly doubled its defense spending in the past decade, to 2.5 percent of GDP. And continued purchases of US arms (like the recent $2 billion sale which included advanced surface-to-air missiles) will offset the current trade imbalance. That, and Taiwan’s demonstrated willingness to do more to bolster its own defenses, would be welcome news to Trump and his foreign policy team. A more robust Taiwanese defense—especially one that seeks to build an asymmetrical advantage against a much more powerful adversary—changes Beijing’s calculus on the odds of mounting a successful military takeover of Taiwan.

Jackson, Not Wilson

Trump’s first administration was roiled by turnover in his cabinet and his White House staff. Many pundits argued these advisors fell out of favor because they were not sufficiently loyal to the president. But a more nuanced view may be more enlightening. Most of Trump’s senior first-term advisors were schooled in Wilsonian Idealism—approaches to foreign policy driven by shared ideological values and imbued with a liberal internationalism. That approach to spreading democracy and capitalism too often relied on American interventionism and lop-sided alliances that are anathema to Trump.

Trump’s second-term foreign policy for China will be driven by first-term lessons learned to create a more realist approach to world affairs, often transactional in nature and, only as needed, multilateral. In his new term he will have the support of experienced staff and advisors prepared to enact and enable policies for fair trade, the rule of law, supportive partnerships, and strong and balanced alliances to build a freer and more open Indo-Pacific.

To that end, there will be more of Jackson than Wilson in Trump’s approach to world affairs in his second term. It’s the pay-off of his populist promise—not to make the world safe for democracy—but to put the security and economic interests of America first.

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Editor’s Note: This is part of Law & Liberty‘s series of Faultline Essays, in which we publish different perspectives on a given topic, allowing authors an opportunity to read and respond to each other’s work before publishing them together.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is, arguably, the most enduring defensive alliance in history. NATO has succeeded—well beyond the guarded expectations of its founders—in its core tasks of deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and collective security for more than 70 years. That success has proven attractive to other European nations and over the decades since its founding in 1949, NATO has grown from an initial 12 members to 30 nation members through eight rounds of enlargement. Enlargement of NATO, then, is neither new nor unprecedented. Today those nations are active participants in their collective security. It would be a mistake, however, to view enlargement of NATO as merely an attempt to grow military capabilities and capacity—more troops, more tanks, more planes.

In the wake of Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, NATO is emerging as a robust multilateral partnership prepared to use diplomatic, informational, and economic means—as well as its combined military strength—to secure and promote peace. NATO has evolved, not mutated as Dr. Maitra claims, and the alliance continues to grow to embrace a role that is now strategic and ideological. NATO defends the sovereignty of nations large and small, enhances collective and cooperative security, promotes stability inside and outside the Euro-Atlantic region, fosters internal development and economic growth, and stands for democracy and the rule of law in the face of the aggression of autocratic regimes.

Defense of Sovereignty

No state can exist as a nation without sovereign borders and those borders must be defended for a nation to survive as an independent polity. Neutrality—even a resolute armed neutrality—is no guarantee of national sovereignty and immunity from attack. Ukraine declared itself a neutral state after it separated from the Soviet Union in 1991. Kyiv dismantled its nuclear arsenal with economic support and security assurances from the United States and Russia. The assurances proved chimerical, and the nation’s neutral status proved meaningless when Russia invaded Crimea and the Donbas in 2014.

Dr. Maitra argues Kyiv could have averted the 2022 Russian invasion and enjoyed its sovereign rights as an independent nation had it only adopted “an Austrian-style constitutional neutrality that would place Ukraine equidistance (sic) from NATO and Russia.” Ukraine did just that in 1996 and only abandoned neutrality after Russia invaded and illegally annexed Crimea. Ukraine then learned the lessons learned by Luxemburg and Belgium in World War I, and by Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway in World War II: neutrality cannot protect democracies from aggressor states and especially authoritarian states where leaders cannot be held accountable by an aggrieved electorate.

Today, NATO’s Open Door Policy provides access “to all European democracies that share the values of (the) Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose membership contributes to our common security.” Finland and Sweden, armed neutral states of long-standing, were given an object lesson in the limits of neutrality when Russia invaded Ukraine this year. Helsinki and Stockholm have now come to grips with the risks of armed neutrality outside of the alliance and submitted NATO Accession Protocols that were accepted at the NATO Madrid Summit in July. Both nations are now on a path to membership.

New accessions to the alliance enhance solidarity among democratic states determined to protect their national sovereignty and respect the sovereignty of other nations. When coupled with membership in the European Union and other multilateral organizations, NATO members on the continent are bound by political, economic and security interests—and mutual interests provide common ground for the arbitration and peaceful resolutions of disputes.

Collective and Cooperative Security

The security agreement among NATO members has shielded Western Europe from the catastrophic conflicts that exhausted the continent twice in the last century. The principle of collective defense is at the heart of the Washington Treaty: collective defense under Article 5 means that an attack on one NATO ally is an attack on all allies. Admittedly, the 78 years since the end of World War II have not seen a perfect peace in Europe, but no NATO nation has been forced to mount a full-scale defense against an invader or suffer occupation, oppression, and rapine by a foreign power.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, newly independent states in Europe—former members of the Warsaw Pact or Soviet satellites—aspired to meet NATO membership requirements and shelter under the alliance’s security umbrella. It proved to be an historic, unprecedented, and hugely successful enlargement of NATO. In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia joined in 2004 and Albania joined in 2009. The record speaks for itself: the collective security afforded these NATO members has been an effective deterrent to aggression and these newly free nations rejected the authoritarian government they knew as Soviet satellites and embraced democracy, western norms of international behavior, and free market economies.

Dr. Maitra has stated further expansion of NATO—ostensibly with the admission of Sweden and Finland—is “a historic mistake,” and that both countries want a “free ride on  the American security umbrella.” This argument ignores the fact neutral Sweden and Finland already have capable military forces; built, and funded their security outside of the alliance; and both nations have announced plans to increase defense spending. The two Nordic nations also bring enhanced naval capabilities into the alliance; Sweden’s navy is ranked fifth in the world and Finland’s navy ranks eleventh. Moreover, the argument ignores the fact that the Alliance has a purpose in fostering greater cooperation beyond the Euro-Atlantic region and outside the American security umbrella.

Cooperative security arrangements have emerged over the last two decades to improve dialog and coordination with non-NATO nations. NATO’s Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee (PCSC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) focus on political and military programs of outreach to non-member countries. The PCSC coordinates activities with nations outside the alliance—notably in the wider Mediterranean region and with Mid-East partners—on transnational issues including combating terrorism, border security, arms proliferation, civil defense, disaster preparedness, and civil-military air traffic control. The PfP pairs NATO nations with partners who select their own priorities for cooperative engagements.

The enlargement of NATO, then, in its broader role of promoting cooperative security in Europe and neighboring regions, extends beyond just the accession of new NATO members to encompass bilateral and multilateral security and stability initiatives with non-member partner nations.

Development and Growth

Membership in NATO provides the security, stability, and cooperation that are pre-requisites for sustained economic growth. Nations that aspire to join the alliance must demonstrate not only that they are committed to collective security, but that they are further committed to a functioning democratic political system based on a free market economy.

Alliance members who have made free market reforms attract foreign direct investment that fuels economic development. These stable and secure states offer risk-averse investors attractive opportunities for investment without the downstream risks of either expropriation or nationalization. Economists have cited this “NATO effect” as a driving factor—alongside lower cost skilled labor, existing infrastructure, and political stability—in real growth in gross domestic product (GDP). This has been especially true among former Soviet-bloc nations that joined the alliance. Poland, for example, with an economy stultified by years of Soviet-style wage and price controls has grown its GDP from US $168B in 1999 to US $674B in 2021—more than four-fold growth in two decades.

Enlargement of NATO through both direct accession and partnering mechanisms grows the free market economies of nations that also enjoy greater cooperation and secure cross-border exchange. The impact of this economic growth is seen in increased social stability, a higher standard of living, a rise in state revenues, and greater access to health care, education, and other social services for millions of citizens of NATO nations.

Democracy and the Rule of Law

If the Soviet Union was the raison d’etre for NATO, then today the alliance would be little more than a relic of Cold War alliances. But NATO has always been more than just a counterweight to the Soviet behemoth in Europe. Fourteen nations joined the alliance after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today, five PfP nations—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Sweden, and Ukraine—aspire to become NATO members. In the last month, Finland and Sweden completed accession talks, successfully negotiated a tri-lateral memorandum of understanding with Turkey that erased Istanbul’s objections to their membership, and now await only formal ratification of their Accession Protocols to become alliance members.

Alliance membership for these nations is more than an effort to bolster their security. The founding NATO nations were united not only in their opposition to communism and authoritarianism; they shared an ardent desire for a just and lasting peace. This is more than what Dr. Maitra claims is “smiley-badge . . . crusading elite-driven transnational liberalism.” In the wake of a cataclysmic war that ravaged an entire continent and eroded the moral foundations of society, NATO members found common cause as democratic nations united to defend western values. The preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty captured the new resolve of the trans-Atlantic partners “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.”

New NATO aspirants must demonstrably share that resolve. In addition to making an ironclad commitment to collective security, maintaining functioning democratic processes, and creating free market economies, aspirants must also show they are prepared to embrace the motive values of the alliance. Membership commits new members to the fair treatment of minority populations in their countries, to the peaceful resolution of conflicts with other states, to democratic civil-military relations, and institutional structures underpinned by the rule of law.

Unity, Comity, and Resolve

The continuing crisis in Ukraine has tested the unity, comity, and resolve of NATO nations and the alliance has not been found wanting. NATO nations are supplying arms and equipment to beleaguered Ukraine and maintaining a long logistics train through their road, rail, and air transport networks. NATO has also united member states and partners as willing participants in enforcing the unprecedented and tough economic sanctions and export controls imposed on Russia. The alliance has also pledged to replace much of Ukraine’s Soviet-era military equipment with NATO-compatible arms.

At the recent Madrid Summit, alliance members renewed their commitment to the Defense Investment Pledge that supports military preparedness in member countries and will boost NATO common funding. That pledge ensures resources will be available to strengthen and modernize the NATO Force structure and ready the alliance for high intensity and multiple-domain operations by growing the NATO Response Force (from 40,000 to 300,000 forces) and creating a rapid response cyber capability.

The Summit declaration also recognizes “distinct threats from all strategic directions” far beyond the borders of the Euro-Atlantic region. Russia “is the most significant and direct threat,” but members also recognize the looming risks of “cyber, space, hybrid, and other asymmetric threats . . . the malicious use of emerging and disruptive technologies . . . and the systemic competition (from) China.” In response, NATO is prepared to take a broader, 360-degree approach to collective security by engaging diplomatic, informational, economic, and military means. It is also an approach that has global reach. Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea—partners from the Asia-Pacific region—attended the summit and signaled their willingness to cooperate and tackle shared security challenges.

In the end, NATO enlargement through the accession of new member nations and through cooperation with partners inside and outside of the Euro-Atlantic region, holds the promise of effective deterrence against aggression and multi-national efforts to meet emerging global challenges. The accession of new nations to the alliance is driven by more than the need for a common defense; it is driven by new members sharing the resolve of the founders of the alliance who were “united in our commitment to democracy, individual liberty, human rights, and the rule of law.”

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The alliance is one of mutual defense and assistance that has grown from its initial twelve members in 1949 to thirty nations today. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, former Soviet Bloc nations in the Baltics and Eastern Europe sought to secure their newfound independence by signing the North Atlantic Treaty and gathering under NATO’s security umbrella. Under Article 5 of the treaty, an attack on one member is regarded as an attack on all and so makes allies of thirty nations—a powerful deterrent to Russian aggression. 

The alliance, however, is now confronted by Russian aggression against a non-NATO nation and the very real possibility of a wider war in Europe. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine threatens to engulf bordering NATO nations. To date, U.S. and NATO officials have resisted mounting a “no-fly zone” over Ukraine. Such a zone would escalate the conflict and require committing NATO aircraft for combat air patrols, refueling, and surveillance and risk those aircraft and crews to Russian fighters and anti-aircraft fire. A rigorously maintained no-fly zone could also require deployment to Ukraine of the U.S.’s advanced Patriot regional air and missile defense system. With a no-fly zone in place, NATO aircraft would be unlikely to operate from cross-border safe havens immune to Russian attack. Russian aircraft currently launching stand-off munitions would have to be attacked in Russian airspace. A dizzying spiral of escalation would inevitably lead to a broader air-land battle.

The western military supply to beleaguered Ukraine also passes through bordering NATO nations, most notably along the long western border with Poland. NATO nations Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia also share a border with Ukraine and may well become future sources of supply. Fierce Ukrainian resistance has hobbled the Russian advance, but that resistance is reliant on open supply lines not only for light infantry weapons and ammunition, but for drones, missiles, and rockets for attacks on Russian aircraft and armor. There are also reports that as many as 15,000 volunteers with military experience came across the border to join the newly formed International Legion for the Territorial Defense of Ukraine. Frustrated in its ambition to see Kiev capitulate and faced with mounting casualties, Moscow will now attack to choke-off Ukraine’s military logistics lifelines at their crossing points with bordering NATO nations. An errant cross-border attack immediately draws NATO nations into the conflict.

Moscow has been hit with crippling economic sanctions and may soon seek to retaliate. Cyberattacks have the global reach to target not just banking and financial networks: power-grids, telecommunications, infrastructure, air traffic control, e-commerce, and social media are at risk. Numerous cyberattacks have already been launched by Russia against Ukraine. If Russia were to launch effective cyberattacks on the United States it could trigger counterattacks not just by U.S. cyber forces, but even by conventional U.S. forces and those of other NATO members. U.S. warfighting doctrine is wholly unsettled on the nature of a proportional response to cyberattack, but a cyberattack resulting in American casualties would justify strikes by cyber or conventional forces.

Russian forces engaged in the invasion of Ukraine vastly outnumber the stoic defenders. But Russian progress has been made in fits and starts with uneven leadership and poorly performing troops. In the face of a stuttering advance by their enemy, Ukrainian forces will continue to use time to their advantage. The weight of Russian armor, artillery, and troop strength, however, is still likely to prevail as field commanders adapt to the situation on the ground and unsnarl supporting logistics. NATO nations will use the time bought by Ukraine’s defenses to continue to supply Kiev with both armaments and a steady stream of tactical and operational intelligence. As Russian forces continue to advance, their extended supply lines will become more vulnerable to hit-and-run attacks by small units. Given the heroic and steadfast resistance of the Ukrainians, Russian-occupied areas of the country will likely become hotbeds of insurgent attacks.

Russian occupation of Ukraine, and the installation of a puppet government to act at the behest of Moscow, would create an eastern bloc of nations aligned against NATO and the West. Moldova has already been drawn into Moscow’s orbit and the staging of Russian forces in Belarus has neatly accomplished the military occupation of that country. NATO now faces the grim reality of an armed military frontier with the line drawn from the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to the Black Sea and the borders of Greece and Turkey—all members of NATO. The Russian invasion of Ukraine may well be the start of a Second Cold War.

The First Cold War ended with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact military alliance and dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. In the decade that followed, the alliance embraced expansion by inviting European nations to submit a Membership Action Plan to join NATO outright, or engage in its Partnership for Peace initiative. The moves were calculated to draw Eastern European nations—once part of the Soviet Bloc—into the orbit of the West.  NATO made inroads on the buffer states that bordered Russia; Moscow seethed impotently.

But all was not well in the West either. European nations balked at the requirement to build up their military forces. President Trump opened himself to ridicule at home and abroad by demanding that NATO nations meet their alliance treaty obligation and devote 2 percent of their GDP to military readiness. Critics of NATO decried the cost and the burden of maintaining the alliance’s military forces and castigated forward deployment of troops—especially U.S. forces—as unnecessarily belligerent and provocative. The U.S. Congress echoed the calls from the parliaments of Europe and openly demanded a “peace dividend” and cuts to military spending. A 2011 New York Times op-ed pointedly asked: “Who Needs NATO?”

That was then; this is now. Russia’s neo-Czarist ambitions, land-grab, and aggression in Ukraine are proof enough that all the free nations of Europe need NATO.

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The “diplomatic boycott” of the Beijing Olympics protested China’s well-known human rights abuses and especially the treatment of the country’s Uyghur minority, persecuted Chinese Muslims. Led by the United States and joined by Australia, Britain, and Canada, the boycott only included diplomats from these countries, later joined by Japanese diplomats, who would simply not travel to Beijing for the games. It was an empty gesture. The boycott did not include athletes from these nations. The games have gone on much to the satisfaction of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and as a salve to the perhaps bruised feelings of China’s President Xi Jinping.

Hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs remained in China’s brutal detention camps.

But while the 2022 Winter Olympics might well be remembered for the athletic competition, and remarked upon for the boycott, it should be noted as the occasion when the United States signaled its impotence to check the repression, aggression, and menace of a rising China. Before the games had even begun—before the Olympic torch was lit by a Chinese Uyghur athlete in a manifestly orchestrated stunt—American leadership conceded the field of play to Chinese state security. No less a person that the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, practically begged American athletes not to protest while in China. “I would say to our athletes: You’re there to compete,” she said. “Do not risk incurring the anger of the Chinese government, because they are ruthless.”

Pelosi’s warning came on the heels of a mid-January 2022 notice from the U.S. Department of State that American citizens visiting China can be detained “for sending private electronic messages critical of the [Chinese] government,” and “may be detained without access to U.S. consular services or information about their alleged crime.” It was a timely warning and, on its face, good advice for any tourists in a country that has laws that allow the police, state security agents, and assorted apparatchiks to arrest and detain—even without charge—anyone who speaks ill of China.

The advisories from Pelosi and the State Department were remarkable not for their alarm, but for the reasons American athletes needed to be muzzled. “I know there is the temptation on the part of some to speak out while they are there. I respect that,” Pelosi explained, “But I also worry about what the Chinese government might do to their reputations, to their families.” She remarkably admitted that the United States cannot now protect its citizens from the menace of China’s threats to their well-being, their persons, and even their families—abroad and at home. And, in an equally stunning move, the U.S. State Department confessed that a United States passport is worthless in China; no U.S. citizen can be assured of their rights under the rule of law, of consular protection, or even access to legal counsel if they are detained in China without cause, without warrant, and without lawful charges.

The Long Reach

China’s Parliament, a rubber stamp for the desires of the Xi regime, is nothing if not fiercely nationalistic and reactionary. In 2020, in the face of growing support for the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, Parliament bypassed that territory’s own Legislative Council to enact a new National Security Law. The law prohibits all activities, by anyone, that “endanger national security.” These are activities that either the Hong Kong or central Chinese government deem to be one of four main and vaguely defined offenses against the state: separatism, subversion, terrorism, and collusion. More worrisome is that the law applies not only to actions by residents of Hong Kong, but actions taken by anyone, anywhere, of any nationality. Just months after the law passed, for example, China issued a warrant for the arrest of an American citizen, Samuel Chu. Chu had threatened China’s national security by using the internet from his home in Los Angeles to promote the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong.

Amnesty International has pointed out that the security law is “dangerously broad and vague . . . can mean virtually anything,” and can “apply to anyone on the planet.” The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights of the United Nations expressed deep-seated concerns that the law would inevitably lead to “discriminatory or arbitrary interpretation and enforcement which could undermine human rights protection,” and politically motivated charges. Persons who are arrested and charged with national security crimes against China are tried in a criminal justice system with a 99 percent conviction rate and extremely limited or no press or public access. In China, even persons not charged with national security crimes—those persons merely suspected of crimes—can be held for “residential surveillance in a designated location,” outside the criminal detention system, without access to counsel, for as long as six months. Detainees held incommunicado in this way, bereft of legal counsel, and lost to family and friends, are plainly at risk of ill-treatment and torture. Journalists, lawyers, activists, and teachers have been subjected to this form of detention. So too have foreign citizens who run afoul of Chinese authorities.

Pelosi’s description of the Chinese government as “ruthless” hardly begins to describe the regime in Beijing.

The Surveillance State

The National Security Law also arms state security and investigators in China with extensive powers. Authorities can search properties; restrict or deny travel; freeze or confiscate assets; conduct covert operations; censor online content; and monitor, record, disrupt or deny personal communications. China’s growing New Social Classes Work Bureau targets the internet and iPhone use of private industry professionals, NGOs, and social media.  It’s no wonder that before the games, the FBI issued a Private Industry Notification (PIN) to alert Olympic participants of the “Potential for Malicious Cyber Activities to Disrupt the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympic and Paralympics.” The PIN raised the alarm on several threats including the risk of malware, phishing attacks, ransomware, and the theft of personal data and personally identifiable information.

In response, many Olympic participants left their personal phones and laptops behind and opted to carry disposable phones or “burners” instead. The US, British, Canadian, Swiss, Swedish, German, and Dutch Olympic committees told their teams, pointedly, not to take their personal electronic equipment to Beijing. Great Britain went so far as to offer its staff and athletes free burners. Olympic participants were also warned about the risks of using free wi-fi access provided by China during the games. That usage would open their phone calls, text, emails, files, photographs, apps, and internet use to a host of malicious actors, and to the Chinese state surveillance system. 

In short, there is no right to privacy in China.

Human Rights Watch has described the massive state surveillance system in China as “Orwellian.” Facial recognition software, telecommunications eavesdropping, thousands of cameras, and a legion of cyber watchers who constantly patrol the internet are only part of the massive monitoring conducted by China. A huge network of informants—both coerced and willing—have the ear of the police and state security services. A single text, an incautious internet search, discussion of a taboo topic, mention of a single word—genocide, torture, rape, starvation, Uyghur—or even a single remark on social media can instantly trigger an interview, an investigation, detention, arrest, or disappearance. That’s what happened to China’s tennis star and three-time Olympian Peng Shuai.

In November 2021, Peng used the Chinese social media website Weibo to say that Zhang Gaoli had forced her into a sexual relationship. The now 75-year old Zhang had previously served as China’s Vice Premier and as the top Chinese official who oversaw plans for the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. Peng’s allegation was quickly scrubbed from Weibo and then she simply disappeared. Her once active social media account went silent for weeks; the hashtag #WhereIsPengShuai trended globally. With China thrust into the spotlight of the upcoming Winter Games, the Peng incident was a propaganda nightmare of Olympic proportions. It is not known what induced Peng to finally reappear and then awkwardly walk back her allegations in a video released by Chinese state media before the start of the Winter Games. But in China, coerced confessions, and videotaped scenes of glassy-eyed mea culpas are not uncommon.

Peng has not attended any event of the Beijing Winter Olympics.

US Response Overdue

If the U.S. State Department and leaders in Washington feel compelled to warn high-profile American athletes that they will not be safe in China, then no American is safe in China. Official restrictions on travel or an outright ban on travel to China is clearly overdue. In late January, the State Department officially posted a travel advisory for China, belatedly urging Americans to “reconsider” their travel plans. It was a Level Three warning (Level Four is “Do Not Travel”) with an accompanying country summary that is chillingly explicit:

The PRC government arbitrarily enforces local laws, including carrying out arbitrary and wrongful detentions and using exit bans on U.S. citizens and citizens of other countries without due process of law. The PRC government uses arbitrary detention and exit bans to: compel individuals to participate in PRC government investigations; pressure family members to return to the PRC from abroad; influence PRC authorities to resolve civil disputes in favor of PRC citizens; and gain bargaining leverage over foreign governments.

The diplomatic boycott of the Winter Games led by the United States was, at best, a half measure, little better than a symbolic gesture of protest. A far more potent and meaningful action would have been a total boycott of the games. In 1980, the Carter Administration launched a boycott of the Summer Olympics in Moscow in a bid to get Soviet troops out of Afghanistan. Sixty-five countries refused to participate in the games; several countries that did compete refused to attend the opening ceremonies, some eschewed the use of their national anthems during medal ceremonies, and others refused to fly their nation’s flags. Even though the Soviet Union was denied an Olympic-sized stage for its propaganda, and lost billions of dollars, the boycott failed to deter Moscow’s aggression in Afghanistan. Ironically, the decade-long Afghan War is now cited by leading historians as one of the reasons that lead to the collapse of the Soviet state.

Beyond Boycott

In the face of Beijing’s extralegal policies and practices—arbitrary enforcement of law, wrongful detention, exit bans (hostage-taking really), denial of the right to counsel, abrogation of the due process of law, coerced confessions, sham criminal trials—an outright ban on travel to China would quickly demonstrate the consequences of purposefully violating international norms of behavior and the rule of law. Tourism accounted for nearly 11 percent of China’s GDP before the pandemic and is a significant source of foreign exchange. Moreover, Beijing continues to rely on the support of foreign experts that travel to China—engineers, technicians, industrialists, information specialists, contractors—to sustain its manufacturing base and the industrialized economy essential to its international exports and the main source of the nation’s revenue.

Even in China, money talks.

In equal measure, the U.S. needs to accelerate its reassessment of visa policies for all Chinese citizens. China’s United Front Work Department (UFWD), handmaiden to the CCP, is a global network of agents and influencers active both inside China and abroad. The UFWD also provides cover for Chinese intelligence agents operating in the U.S. and other nations. A 2020 White House report described UFWD efforts to “target businesses, universities, think tanks, scholars, journalists, and local, state, and Federal officials in the United States and around the world, attempting to influence discourse and restrict external influence inside the PRC.” In December 2020, the State Department imposed visa restrictions on UFWD agents “who have engaged in the use or threat of physical violence, theft and release of private information, espionage, sabotage, or malicious interference in domestic political affairs, academic freedom, personal privacy, or business activity.”

While there is no evidence that U.S. Olympians in Beijing were specifically targeted by the UFWD, these high-profile athletes are valuable prospects as influencers in the press and on social media. The threat of the theft of private information and invasion of personal privacy was real enough to persuade western governments to urge team members and staff to leave their personal electronic devices behind when they traveled to Beijing. But the reach of the internet beyond the Great Firewall of China is global and immediate. The personal electronic devices of millions of Americans and American companies remain vulnerable to China’s state-sponsored surveillance, hacking, and manipulation. 

In July 2021, the U.S. Government formally accused China of a massive cyberattack on Microsoft’s Exchange e-mail server. The attack compromised tens of thousands of computers in the United States and worldwide allowing the hackers to access huge amounts of sensitive information and exposing the vulnerability of these networks to concentrated state-sponsored attacks. In a response that can best be described as a “severe finger-wagging,” the United States issued a joint statement in concert with Australia, Britain, Canada, the European Union, Japan, and New Zealand to criticize China’s involvement. NATO also piled on with a statement publicly calling out Beijing for cybercrimes.

But public condemnations do nothing to deter China.

In this instance, there is a compelling case for the United States to lead a concerted effort to enlist allies and partners in a broader legal effort to hold China—and Chinese leaders—accountable for these cybercrimes. That effort, composed as it must be of criminal indictments, prosecution, and economic sanctions, cannot succeed without a broad base of global support. The diplomatic boycott of the Games, even as it was unsuccessful in ending the human rights violations and genocidal practices of the Chinese state, may well have proved its worth as the first tangible evidence of the willingness of nations to stand together and stand up to Beijing.

The boycott, the alarms, and the warnings occasioned by the 2022 Winter Olympics may be the first sign of solidarity in opposition to Beijing even as China feigns compliance with the rule of law, makes a pretense of respect for human rights, and goes through the motions of adherence to international norms of behavior. It is also a clear sign that the United States must continue to lead by example and redefine relations with China that ensure the health, safety, well-being, and security of the American people. No Americans—at home or abroad in China or in other nations—should fear for their safety when calling on Beijing to be an honest partner in business, a good neighbor in the world community, a prudent steward of the environment, or when openly and honestly criticizing human rights violations and genocide.

No citizens of any country should live in fear of Beijing. Even the citizens of China.

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It was a fanciful tale on two counts: Zheng never sailed into Manila Bay and Xi’s regime in Beijing has brought no peace to the South China Sea (SCS).

Behind Beijing’s once-beguiling diplomacy is the now unconcealed Chinese design to encompass nearly the whole of the SCS as territorial waters of China. China claims sovereignty over virtually all the islands of the SCS and the adjacent territorial waters, even though much of this area is in the demarcated Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) inside the 200 nautical mile limit of the coastlines of Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan.

The Nine Dash Lines

The significance and consequences of these Chinese claims cannot be overstated. China’s intention is to make more than 80-85 percent of that region part of its own EEZ at the expense of other nations and the international community. China wants to claim sovereign territorial rights to these waters and, thereby, justification to control the passage of the world’s ships—both merchant and military—in what have always been international waters. Some $5.3 trillion in global trade and 30 percent of global oil exports ship through these same waters annually. In addition, these claims would give China exclusive rights, according to a diplomatic note Beijing penned to the international Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, “to the relevant waters and seabed and subsoils thereof,” and the vast fisheries, minerals, and fossil fuels in these waters—which the US Energy Information Agency estimates hold 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.

At the center of China’s unprecedented claim is a crude map of the ‘nine dash lines’ that encompass nearly all of the islands in the SCS. The map was created after World War II by the Kuomintang government of the Republic of China and quickly adopted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to represent the Chinese nation’s historic legacy of territories from the Ming and Qing dynasties and bolster the Party’s irredentist claims. Unlike its geo-political rivals—with foreign policies and plans that can turn on the result of an election—China’s strategy for this region is rooted in Party orthodoxies and mapped out over decades. Beijing is positioned here to play the “long game” to outlast its rivals, exhaust any opponents, and present a fait accompli to the international community of ownership by occupation in the SCS. That strategy is bolstered by a cunning campaign of propaganda that stirs Chinese pride and patriotism and bolsters the standing of the Xi regime.

Beijing’s 2009 announcement of territorial claims in the SCS put it on a collision course with the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia—all nations that officially protested the use of the line to establish PRC territories in the SCS. Since 2016, Beijing has taken increasingly bellicose actions in the region—actions that have moved from strident diplomatic demands, through a phase of low intensity coercion to brazen displays of military muscle. In so doing, China is acting outside the norms of international behavior and ignoring the rule of law. In response, other nations are left with very few options to dissuade, to deter, or to deny China’s extraterritorial ambitions in the SCS—and all are fraught with risk.

Little room is now left for SCS nations and the international community to rely on diplomacy and suasion to pull China back from its unlawful island occupations or steer Beijing away from a course that risks regional armed conflict and threat of a wider war. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) would seem well positioned to help resolve the dispute. China, however, is not an ASEAN member state, so the dispute is not an intra-ASEAN issue. Moreover, any action taken by the United Nations inimical to China’s interest would immediately draw Beijing’s veto from its seat on the Security Council.

Diplomacy and the Law of the Sea

Beijing regards disputes in the SCS as matters for bilateral negotiations. Bilateralism gives Beijing greater control over the outcomes of its diplomacy and the ability to conduct negotiations privately. China has little or nothing to gain from multi-lateral initiatives and so refuses to be a party to international efforts to find a diplomatic solution. The most meaningful attempt at international diplomacy was made in 2013 when the Philippines sought formal arbitration to resolve its dispute with China over possession of territory in the Spratly Islands. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague ruled in 2016 there was “no legal basis for China to claim historic rights,” to exclusive control of the waters and resources inside the dash lines. The tribunal also found China had violated Philippine sovereignty and caused “severe harms” to the environment.

The nations aggrieved by China’s claims welcomed and accepted the unequivocal and unprecedented ruling. China purposefully declared the ruling “null and void.” Paramount Leader Xi bluntly rejected the ruling outright and stated flatly “China’s territorial sovereignty and marine rights in the South China Sea will not be affected by the so-called Philippines South China Sea ruling in any way.”

Xi was as good as his word. The Xi regime is using China’s vast resources and all the levers of the nation’s power—diplomatic, informational, military, economic—to intimidate, overmatch, and coerce nations bordering the region to gain and keep control of the islands and waters of the SCS.

Beijing has invested heavily in its debunked nine dash narrative as a part of China’s administrative territory. These claims play to the Party’s nationalist overtures and are ingrained in a studied campaign of propaganda to build national unity and a broad view of the Party as guardian of the nation’s sovereignty. The nine dash line now appears on passports and maps; in schoolroom texts, books, movies, television programs, and on-line games; on leaflets; and even on t-shirts. The movie Abominable—co-produced by US and Chinese animation studios in 2019—provoked censorship in Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines by including a glimpse of the nine dash line map. It’s a clever and well-orchestrated information campaign and a telling demonstration of China’s ability to pull one of the levers of soft power. Then, in 2020, China unilaterally announced it had established two new administrative districts in the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands, both of which are claimed by Vietnam.

In the face of failed diplomacy and the Xi regime’s resolute defiance of the results of international arbitration, some SCS nations seek to deter China from using force to establish more than just titular administrative control of the region. None of these nations, however, seem willing or even able to act in concert for mutual defense. The best that can be said of any effort at building a military deterrent is that it may be sufficient to make it costly for China to resort to the overt use of force in the territorial waters of a rival claimant.

Vietnam, for example, now has military capabilities that arguably give that nation a credible military deterrent. The Vietnam People’s Army (VPA) procured Russian-built arms that include six modern Kilo-class diesel submarines, frigates, and corvettes. In addition, the VPA has added a network of anti-area missiles that include the Russian Bastion shore based anti-ship cruise missile system and modernized its air forces with long range strike aircraft. Vietnam has also improved its island outposts in the Spratlys, adding guided rocket artillery launchers on several installations—weapons capable of striking Chinese land-based targets in the region.

Given continued Chinese provocations in the SCS, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines all plan to upgrade and modernize their armed forces but are hamstrung by both limited budgets and the dead weight of old and obsolete equipment. The Philippines, for example, carry in inventory ships that are four decades old and even some that were commissioned during World War II. Manila has been more successful in rebuilding its coast guard and—with Japanese funding and shipbuilding—will take possession of the first two of ten, armed, 300-foot, multi-role response vessels in 2022.

But there is no naval arms race underway in the SCS. The reality is that SCS nations with claims in the region would be hard-pressed to mount any effective response to Chinese maritime intervention and have no means of projecting power, of sustaining offensive operations, or even of maintaining a Fabian defense in their own waters. China’s military capabilities are overwhelming already and still growing. With a fleet of 300 surface ships and submarines, the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is the largest in Asia; the flotilla of the Chinese Southern Theater Navy is the dominant force in the SCS.

Projecting Power

But Beijing’s military strategy is not just to achieve regional maritime dominance. The PRC aims to amass power projection capabilities from forward operating bases on islands throughout the SCS. During the last decade, China has been engaged in a sustained effort to build bases on what once were little more than small island strips of sand, shallow reefs, and rocks. Some 3,200 acres of new land for bases has been created by massive dredging operations in the disputed Spratly Islands and hundreds more acres have been created in the Paracel Islands. These bases are now the site of port facilities and airfields to support maritime logistics, sea patrols and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. China has also fortified these island outposts with bunkers, radar installations, upgraded sensors and anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles. In 2019, China conducted an anti-ship ballistic missile test near the Spratly Islands to showcase an enhanced naval capability and demonstrate the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ability to counter any military interventions.

Beijing has yet to permanently deploy forces of the PLAN, or the Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) to these military outposts. But deployment of PLA forces to these forward bases would give China the capability to handily defeat the weaker military forces of other SCS nations and project power deep into the surrounding ocean areas. This war-time deployment would likely be Beijing’s military response to the worst-case scenario of concerted action by SCS nations, or Western or US intervention to deny China control of the region.

Instead, China will, in the near term, continue to rely on coercion and intimidation tactics—radioed threats, shadowing, ramming ships, using water cannons, tracking with fire control radar—short of the overt use of armed force. These so-called “gray-zone” tactics engage the China Coast Guard (CCG) in supposed maritime law enforcement operations and the Peoples Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) in harassing commercial fishing fleets, small merchant vessels, and exploration and survey ships of other nations operating in the SCS. The CCG is the largest such force in the world with more than 300 vessels. More than 70 percent of all major “incidents at sea” in the SCS involve CCG and PAFMM vessels. Earlier this year China’s new Coast Guard Law transferred control of the CCG from civilian to military hands and, ominously, authorized the CCG to use lethal force on foreign vessels that fail to heed orders to leave waters claimed by China. There are teeth in that threat to use force, too. All CCG ships are well-armed and in 2017, the CCG added a 12,000-ton cutter to its forces in the region. It’s the most heavily armed coast guard ship in the world and a vessel larger than a US Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser. Beyond the CCG, the Southern Theater Navy is just over the horizon and, once committed, land-based attack aircraft can sortie from fortified Chinese-held island bases throughout the SCS in support of any Chinese maritime force.

More worrisome is China’s engagement in slow intensity conflict—forceful actions to press up to and even past the maritime frontiers of nations in the region—and create a de facto permanent presence with its large fishing fleet and with PAFMM and resource survey ships. The Xi regime seems intent to do so even in the face of the lawfully adjudicated claims of neighboring nations, in contravention of international agreements and law, and at the risk of the opprobrium of the world community. China has also assumed an increasingly bellicose posture in the region and, lately, a willingness to engage in saber-rattling and massive show-of-force demonstrations. This year China conducted some 20 amphibious landing exercises in the SCS and in the Taiwan Strait, launched more than 100 aircraft over a three-day period to test Taiwan’s air defense systems, and kicked off a series of robust naval exercises immediately before combined drills for the United States, India, Japan, and Australia took place off the coast of Guam.

Taiwan presents the only robust military force in the region, but Taipei’s Operational Defense Concept is a defensive strategy oriented to preserving assets after a first strike, fighting a decisive battle in its immediate littoral region, and destroying invading forces during landing. Taiwan does not possess an expeditionary capability and is unlikely to commit forces to the undefended Taiping Island in the SCS. Taiwan’s most credible deterrence lies in its unique relationship with the United States. Washington has never explicitly committed to a defense of Taiwan and has lately sent mixed signals of its future intent. But military to military contacts between the two nations are extensive and the US has enhanced Taiwan’s security with substantial and regular arms sales. More critically, defense of Taiwan is regarded as a litmus test for US resolve in its relations with friendly nations and partners in Asia.

Deterrence Lost

The grim reality is SCS countries are simply overmatched. Beijing’s constant campaign of coercion, harassment, the use of gray zone tactics, slow intensity conflict, and the threat of massive use of force are all intended to sap the strength and weaken the resolve of other claimants in the SCS. The nations of Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam have few options to effectively counter future Chinese military operations. Diplomacy and dissuasion have failed to produce results. Deterring Chinese aggression in the SCS is possible but can only be achieved by nations with credible military capabilities and the readiness to engage in armed conflict. This level of deterrence is only possible with the support of the international community and leadership from the West, and especially from the United States. To deny Beijing control over the islands and waters of the SCS risks not only regional conflict, but the possibility of a wider Pacific war.

Beijing’s revanchist foreign policy at play in the South China Sea is rooted in a strategy that constantly seeks to legitimize the Communist Party as the guardian of the state. The nation’s territorial sovereignty is imperative to a government that demands absolute authority to protect the homeland from fractious internal unrest, from the predations of bordering countries, and from foreigners, like those who occupied China during its Century of Humiliation. China’s foreign policy in the South China Sea also demonstrates the Party’s determination to claim historic rights to territories even as reputable historians debunk those claims. Simply put, Beijing cannot back down from its claims in the SCS; there is no way to do so that permits the Xi regime to save face.

If the Xi regime succeeds and realizes its extraterritorial claims, without resort to force of arms in a broad conflict, China will present Asian nations, the West, and the United States with a stunning setback. Beijing will also have succeeded in legitimizing the Xi regime and the territorial goals of the Communist Party, undercutting US influence in the region, and reaping the rewards of unchecked aggression.

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