The phenomenon colloquially known as “wokeness” has been subject to a number of analyses in recent years. For the most part, these focus on the development of woke ideas and how they have gained social influence. Some accounts point to left-modern liberalism, others emphasize postmodernism or critical theory. Some see the spread of wokeness as a grassroots phenomenon facilitated by social media, while others highlight the role played by public intellectuals, legal institutions, or major corporations. While these interpretations vary in important ways, they typically share an assumption that the defining feature of wokeness is its ideas, which commentators tend to view as both radical and pernicious.

In his new book from Princeton University Press, We Have Never Been Woke: The Cultural Contradictions of a New Elite, sociologist Musa al-Gharbi challenges this notion, arguing that wokeness is ultimately a manifestation of a particular set of social conditions. What is important about woke ideas (an inchoate blend of identity politics, therapeutic sensibility, fixation on unconscious bias, obsession with group disparities, and a “somewhat mystical” understanding of identity, espoused in a moralistic and quasi-religious manner) is not their content, but rather who uses them and how. Wokeness is not a problem of pernicious ideas taking root, but rather one of elite overproduction.

Al-Gharbi’s account can be summarized as follows: In the early twentieth century, there arose a new class of professionals he labels “symbolic capitalists,” consisting of those “who traffic in symbols and rhetoric, images and narratives, data and analysis, ideas and abstraction,” and who inhabit the professions of “education, science, tech, finance, media law, consulting, administration, and public policy.” These professionals have come to dominate the top of the Western world’s hourglass economy, and throughout the book, the terms “symbolic capitalists” and “elites” are used interchangeably. In the midst of the Great Recession, America’s elites were not doing well. Many found themselves unemployed or underemployed and unable to achieve the standard of living and social status they felt was their due. Newly graduated prospective elites were underwhelmed by their prospects, and resentful toward a society that failed to afford them the same opportunities as it had their elders.

The response from these disaffected would-be elites was to condemn that society from top to bottom, with particular venom reserved for the upper echelons of the knowledge economy from which they felt excluded. Using the tools of their trade—the argument, the keyboard, and the online platform—they denounced the existing social order as fundamentally unjust, oppressive, racist, patriarchal, etc., and declared the reigning crop of elites complicit in this system of oppression due to their failure to adopt more radical woke stances. Through such denunciations, disaffected elites obtained a degree of moral status, and in some cases, professional opportunities as well. Feeling besieged, existing elites adopted a strategy of appeasement, engaging in self-denunciations and public woke signaling in order to shore up their own moral status and maintain legitimacy within their professional class. This led to a cascade of elites at different levels trying to outflank one another in expressions of wokeness, resulting in increasingly radical and absolutist norms of obeisance to woke orthodoxy within the knowledge professions. 

The cult-like insanity of the moment, described by al-Gharbi as “the fourth Great Awokening” (this is not the first such moment), is thus ultimately a function of competition among symbolic capitalists striving for professional advancement under the guise of moral crusading. Awokenings can be expected to persist until the symbolic capitalist economy recovers sufficiently to incorporate its surplus of disaffected elites, a process that appears already to be well underway.

Importantly, al-Gharbi sees the content of woke ideas as largely inconsequential, for the simple reason that the proponents of wokeness do not exhibit any real interest in social transformation. Their revealed preferences indicate their goal is not to reshape the existing social order, but simply to rise through its ranks. It is not that he thinks woke elites are being insincere, but rather that sincerity doesn’t count for much. We are quite capable of convincing ourselves of the truth of a thing when it benefits us. As judged by their habits, preferences, and politics, however, symbolic capitalists appear entirely comfortable exploiting existing social arrangements so as to maintain their professional status and material comfort, with little regard for the deprivations experienced by those below them on the social ladder. Among myriad other illustrations, he recalls his observations of mostly white and privileged Columbia students demanding time off from class to recover from the alleged trauma of Trump’s 2016 election and the racism and xenophobia it heralded. It seemed to never occur to them that the largely nonwhite and immigrant service and maintenance staff should be granted similar respite. 

After outlining his general theory of wokeness in the first two chapters, al-Gharbi spends the remainder of the book detailing how symbolic capitalists deploy wokeness in order to preserve and legitimate their social advantage. His exposition is equal parts matter-of-fact and merciless. Woke elites condemn economic inequality, yet patronize a gig and delivery economy (Uber, Grubhub, Amazon) that is corrosive to wages and labor conditions among the working class. They transform urban neighborhoods in ways that cater to their personal preferences and sense of safety and comfort, rendering them unaffordable for the previous, largely poorer and minority, inhabitants. They praise diversity in theory while ensconcing themselves in homogenous communities and social networks in practice. They decry the injustices of privilege as they staff their organizations with graduates of the most elite schools. They lament racial inequality while operating in professions in which Blacks and Hispanics are notably underrepresented. They hand-wring over “dark money” yet vote for the Democratic candidates who are its primary recipients. They rage against the wealthy who don’t “pay their fair share,” yet support policies and engage in practices that minimize their own tax burdens. They denounce intolerance and rigidity in their political opponents, yet exhibit distinctively high levels of partisan hostility and inflexible, ideologically bounded thinking. They claim political solidarity with the downtrodden, yet seek to impose a set of beliefs and policies unpopular among marginalized Americans. They offer land acknowledgments professing guilt for the occupation of territory they have no intention of vacating. In brief, woke elites relentlessly lambast a social structure of which they themselves are the primary shapers, administrators, and beneficiaries.

The ideological system elaborated by woke elites, though seemingly radical and subversive, is ultimately arranged to perpetuate and justify their social privilege. Al-Gharbi focuses in particular on “victimhood culture”—a system in which claims to victimhood grant one moral and epistemic status—and the valorization of ostensibly marginalized minority identities. On the surface, whether one agrees with these ideas or not, one might at least suppose they are geared toward improving the condition of the underprivileged. Yet it is the privileged who elaborate these systems, subscribe to them, and know best how to make good use of them. Woke elites are particularly adept at narrating their life stories in such a way as to highlight (or concoct) experiences of overcoming disadvantages or working through trauma in order to reach their goals. They maximize (or fabricate) any claim to identity as a racial or sexual minority, however remote or implausible, to enhance social legitimacy. (Al-Gharbi’s recounting of the case of Elizabeth Warren’s purported Native American ancestry is particularly unforgiving.) They develop an idiosyncratic vocabulary around these ideas (“Latinx,” “BIPOC,” pronouns in bios) in which they are especially fluent, and use this language to distinguish between those who do and do not belong in elite circles. 

It is often assumed that belief in meritocracy and wokeness are at odds, but al-Gharbi argues that they are symbiotic. By elaborating convoluted claims to social disadvantage, woke elites are able to argue that they are exceptionally meritorious. After all, look at how far they have come given everything they have been through. It is crucial for woke elites to perpetuate an ideology affirming that they deserve their wealth and social status, and this requires some acknowledgment of the importance of merit. At the same time, by declaring social inequality to be “structural,” “institutional,” or “systemic” in some deterministic and mystical sense, they divert attention from the concrete processes that perpetuate their own advantages at others’ expense, and thus absolve themselves of responsibility for the social problems they lament.

These woke machinations come at a cost, but that cost is not typically paid by symbolic capitalists. It is paid, in part, by those who are ostensibly the intended beneficiaries of woke ideas. Racial minorities or immigrants from poorer backgrounds tend not to share the ideological commitments, preferences, or vocabularies of woke elites. Though possessing minority identities that carry currency in elite circles, they lack the ability to signal that they are the right kind of minority. They are thus ill-equipped to benefit from diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) measures or similar initiatives. Insofar as such policies do benefit minorities, they tend to be those who were already the most well-off, often of mixed-race or wealthy immigrant backgrounds that afford them the benefits of valorized identities sans the material disadvantage. 

The cost is further paid by those whose status is denigrated within systems of wokeness, namely, the “cishet” white Christians of flyover country who serve a scapegoat function for woke elites. Though in many cases these populations are demonstrably not flourishing, woke elites nonetheless brand them as the beneficiaries of a mystical systemic oppression. Due to their demographic traits, they are guilty of the sin of privilege. Yet unlike white or “cishet” woke elites, they do not espouse the correct views or engage in the symbolic self-flagellation necessary to expiate their sins. Any suffering they accrue in the current social order is thus deserved, and so not indicative of social problems that warrant redress.

The spirit of the book is effectively summarized in the conclusion when al-Gharbi writes of woke elites: “Whatever ‘social justice’ looks like, it does not seem to be well reflected in symbolic capitalist institutions. … Whatever ‘moral virtue’ is, we don’t seem to embody it in any particularly exceptional way. Whatever the core problems ailing society are perceived to be, we can be confident that the solution is not just to continue what we’ve been doing, but more or harder or with greater sincerity. Not only are we not ‘there’ yet with respect to social justice, but it isn’t clear we’re anywhere close to being on the right track.” 

Readers on the right may be tempted to lick their lips with schadenfreude at this thorough and devastating indictment of woke elites, but to do this would be to miss al-Gharbi’s intended point. We Have Never Been Woke is not a critique from the right, but rather the materialist left. Al-Gharbi takes it for granted that America’s massive social inequality is an egregious injustice and preeminent moral concern. The problem with wokeness is that it does nothing to address that concern, and even exacerbates it. The trouble with woke elites isn’t that they are too radical, but that they are not nearly radical enough. Furthermore, his brief treatment of conservative and anti-woke symbolic capitalists is not any more favorable. Though they occupy slightly different niches in the symbolic economy and espouse different ideas, they wield those ideas toward the same end, namely, to secure their professional status at the expense of those below them on the social ladder. 

This brings me to my key critique of al-Gharbi’s work, which is phenomenal overall. Though he does not state as much outright, readers may easily come away with the impression that a) ideas in themselves do not matter, and b) there is no meaningful variation among symbolic capitalists. The book offers little sense of what (if anything) ideas do, and whether they might be deployed more effectively for the good of society rather than just for knowledge elites. Since We Have Never Been Woke is written by and for symbolic capitalists, one might hope for more targeted guidance on what responsible symbolic capitalism would look like. As al-Gharbi provides no sense of the intrinsic meaning or value of symbolic capitalist activities, however, we are left with little beyond, “Go, sell what you own and give to the poor.” Yet in writing the book, presumably al-Gharbi did not hope merely to advance his professional interests, but also to disrupt the unjust processes he exposes—using the power of his ideas. By neglecting any discussion of how others might do the same, he provides an account that reads as bleaker and more deterministic than it needs to be.

This concern aside, We Have Never Been Woke promises to be a seminal contribution to our understanding of the phenomenon known as wokeness. This is not only due to the quality of its scholarship, which is considerable, but also the credibility of its source. As a nonwhite, socialist-leaning Muslim sociologist with impeccable academic credentials and a compelling biography (including having been once canceled by Fox News), Musa al-Gharbi is a messenger who cannot be dismissed by those most in need of his message. If, as al-Gharbi believes, the current Great Awokening is coming to a close, this book will be an invaluable aid as we sort through the wreckage and grapple with difficult questions of how we symbolic capitalists can contribute to the flourishing of our societies, and not just of ourselves.